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Abstract 
The interpretation of the concept of reduced state is a subtle issue that has relevant consequences 
when the task is the interpretation of quantum mechanics itself. The aim of this paper is to argue that 
reduced states are not the quantum states of subsystems in the same sense as quantum states are 
states of the whole composite system. After clearly stating the problem, our argument is developed 
in three stages. First, we consider the phenomenon of environment-induced decoherence as an 
example of the case in which the subsystems interact with each other; we show that decoherence 
does not solve the measurement problem precisely because the reduced state of the measuring 
apparatus is not its quantum state. Second, the non-interacting case is illustrated in the context of no-
collapse interpretations, in which we show that certain well-known experimental results cannot be 
accounted for due to the fact that the reduced states of the measured system and the measuring 
apparatus are conceived as their quantum states. Finally, we prove that reduced states are a kind of 
coarse-grained states, and for this reason they cancel the correlations of the subsystem with other 
subsystems with which it interacts or is entangled. 
1.  Introduction 
In physics it is common to talk about composite quantum systems and their subsystems. In general, 
given two systems 1S  and 2S , represented in the Hilbert spaces 1H  and 2H  respectively, the system 
1 2S S S= +  represented in 1 2= ⊗H H H  is said to be composite: 1S  and 2S  are considered as 
subsystems of S . The relationship between the composite system and its subsystems is usually 
defined independently from whether 1S  and 2S  interact with each other or not, and from whether the 
state of S  is entangled or not: in any case, the common practice is to conceive the quantum states of 
the subsystems 1S  and 2S  as their reduced states, computed on the state of the whole system S  by 
tracing over the degrees of freedom of 2S  and 1S  respectively. This is a basic assumption in the 
theory of environment-induced decoherence (Zurek 1981, 1982, 1991, 1993, 1994; for a review, see 
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Zurek 2003), which aims at explaining the emergence of classicality from the quantum realm in 
terms of the fast diagonalization of the reduced state of a system in interaction with its environment. 
Reduced states also play a central role in certain no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
as the modal interpretations (see, e.g. Kochen 1985, Dieks 1988, 1989, 1998, 1994a, 1994b, 
Vermaas & Dieks 1995, Lombardi & Castagnino 2008, Ardenghi, Castagnino & Lombardi 2009, 
Lombardi, Castagnino & Ardenghi 2010, Ardenghi & Lombardi 2011; for a review, see Lombardi & 
Dieks 2012), in which it is supposed that the quantum states of the measured system and of the 
measuring apparatus after the measurement interaction are represented by operators resulting from 
partial traces. 
The presence of reduced states is certainly pervasive in practice, and physicists perfectly know 
how to use them. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the concept of reduced state is a subtle issue that 
has relevant consequences when the task is the interpretation of quantum mechanics itself. In 
general, a reduced state is simply considered the quantum state of an open system, since it allows us 
to compute the expectation values of all the observables of that system, exactly like the state of the 
whole system with respect to all its observables. The aim of this paper is to reject that common 
assumption by arguing that reduced states are actually not the quantum states of subsystems in the 
same sense as quantum states are states of the whole composite system. After stating the general 
problem of interpreting the state of a mechanical theory, our argument will be developed in three 
stages. First, we will consider the phenomenon of environment-induced decoherence as an example 
of the interacting case, in order to explain that it does not solve the measurement problem precisely 
because the reduced state of the measuring apparatus −modeled as an open system in continuous 
interaction with its environment− is not its quantum state. Second, the non-interacting case will be 
illustrated in the context of no-collapse interpretations, in which we will show that certain well-
known experimental results cannot be accounted for due to the fact that the reduced states of the 
measured system and the measuring apparatus are conceived as their quantum states. Finally, we will 
argue that reduced states are a kind of coarse-grained states, and for this reason they cancel the 
correlations of the subsystem with other subsystems with which it interacts or is entangled. The 
moral of the present work will be that the difference between quantum states and reduced states 
cannot be disregarded, in particular when foundational issues about the theory are considered: an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics should not endow quantum states and reduced states with the 
same meaning if conceptual puzzles are to be avoided. 
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2.  Stating the problem  
A physical theory, in particular, a mechanics, is characterized by certain elementary assumptions 
−postulates− that supply the starting point of any development of the theory. Among these 
assumptions, two are unavoidable: the definition of the state and the dynamical law that rules the 
time evolution of that state. For instance, in classical mechanics the state is given by the position and 
the momentum of the body −and other degrees of freedom if it is not a point particle− and the 
dynamical law is Newton’s Second Law. This departing point is unavoidable from the conceptual 
viewpoint, since an essential part of the interpretation of the theory under consideration consists in 
elucidating the meaning of the corresponding state. 
In order to illustrate what was said above, let us consider Gibbsian statistical mechanics: in 
this case, the state is given by the density function ( , )x tρ , defined on a phase space Γ , which 
evolves according to the Liouville equation. During the last decades many discussions focused on 
the use of ensembles in the definition of the density function, the connection of the density function 
with the different interpretations of probability, etc. (see, e.g., Frigg 2007, Uffink 2007). One of the 
central problems in this theoretical context is how to explain the approach to equilibrium by means 
of the time evolution of the density function. In fact, as it is well known, the evolution of ( , )x tρ  has 
no limit for t → ∞ : the volume of the support of ( , )x tρ  in Γ  is time-invariant as a consequence of 
the Liouville theorem. When classical statistical mechanics is formulated in the formalism of 
Koopman (1931) −its Hilbert space formulation−, that result can be expressed by saying that the 
vector state ρ  evolves unitarily according to 0 0( ) iGttt U e−ρ = ρ = ρ , where 0ρ  is the initial state and 
G  is the generator of the evolution, which represents the energy of the system: since tU  is a unitary 
operator, it does not change the angle of separation (the inner product) or the distance (the square 
modulus of the difference) between vectors representing two different states. In other words, due to 
its unitary evolution, ( )tρ  has no limit for t → ∞ . Therefore, the problem of irreversibility in 
classical statistical mechanics turns out to be how to account for a non-unitary irreversible approach 
to equilibrium in systems ruled by a unitary evolution law (see Lombardi 2003, Frigg 2007).  
The standard answer in the context of the Gibbsian approach consists in relying on coarse-
graining: the phase space Γ  is partitioned into cells iC  of a same volume ic  in Γ , and a coarse-
grained distribution cgρ  is defined such that, for each iC , 
if , ( ) 0 0
if , ( ) 0 1 ( ) 0
i
i cg
i cg i C
x C x
x C x c x dx
∀ ∈ ρ = → ρ =
∃ ∈ ρ ≠ → ρ = ρ ≠∫
       (1) 
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It is quite clear that, since the coarse-grained state cgρ  is not the original statistical state, it is not 
governed by the dynamical law of classical statistical mechanics and, as a consequence, its evolution 
is not constrained by the Liouville theorem: ( )cg tρ  may approach a definite limit for t → ∞ . This is 
what effectively happens when the system has a sufficiently high degree of instability: if the system 
is mixing, it can be proved that the coarse-grained state approaches an equilibrium state, 
( )( )cg cg eqtρ → ρ  (see, e.g., Berkovitz, Frigg & Kronz 2006). 
Of course, discussions also focus on the meaning of the coarse-grained state: Does it supply 
the objective description of an emergent process? Or does it only describe our ignorance about the 
real underlying evolution? These questions express the different interpretations of irreversibility, in 
the context of a debate that is still as alive as in the birth of statistical mechanics (see, e.g., Nicolis & 
Prigogine 1989, Lebowitz 1993, 1994a, 1994b, Driebe 1994, Bricmont 1995, Earman & Rédei 1996, 
Callender 1999). Nevertheless, despite the heated discussions and the deep disagreements about 
interpretation, nobody ignores the difference between the statistical state, which evolves unitarily 
according to the dynamical postulate of the theory, and the coarse-grained state, which may tend to a 
final stable state. Even those authors who take a heterodox position by claiming the priority of the 
coarse-grained state regarding objectivity, are clear that such a move requires a reformulation of the 
dynamical law of the theory (see, e.g., Misra, Prigogine & Courbage 1979, Nicolis & Prigogine 
1989). In other words, independently of the particular disagreements, nobody attempts to endow the 
statistical state and the coarse-grained state with the same interpretation.  
What happens in quantum mechanics? As it is well known, the hottest conceptual discussions 
about the theory are those referred to the interpretation of the quantum state. Does it describe a 
physical field on physical but empirically inaccessible degrees of freedom? Or does it represent our 
degrees of knowledge? Or does it embody certain objective propensities to actualization? This kind 
of questions has led to the wide spectrum of interpretations of the theory, which continues to grow. 
In particular, the question of the meaning of the quantum state is a topic that attracts the interest of 
researchers up to the present (see, e.g. Ney & Albert 2013, in particular, Maudlin’s article “The 
nature of the quantum state” in that volume). Given the open-question status of this issue, it deserves 
to be still discussed in detail. 
Paradoxically, despite the severity of the interpretive problem, in certain contexts the 
distinction between the different kinds of states appearing in the quantum discourse is not 
sufficiently emphasized. In the standard presentations of the theory, the quantum state is represented 
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by an operator ρ∈ ⊗H = H , where H  is a Hilbert space (pure states represented by vectors ψ ∈ H  
can be considered as the particular case ρ = ψ ψ ), and its unitary time-evolution is ruled by the 
von Neumann equation (or, in the particular case of pure states, by the Schrödinger equation).1 
However, in recent times this presentation has been downplayed by the irruption of the reduced 
states. For instance, it is said that the dynamical postulate of quantum mechanics only applies to 
closed systems, whereas reduced operators actually represent quantum states of open systems.2 
Nevertheless, we are not informed about the evolution law for reduced states; in fact, the evolution 
of open systems always depends, in the final analysis, on the unitary evolution of the whole closed 
system of which the open system is a part. It is also admitted that, whereas the states of closed 
systems embody quantum correlations, reduced states may cancel those correlations and, as a 
consequence, cannot be used for computations in certain cases.3 However, in spite of this central 
difference, the states of closed and open systems are treated on equal footing. In turn, the coarse-
grained nature of the reduced states is acknowledged by some authors −although without explicitly 
demonstrating this claim− (see, e.g., Anastopoulos 2002). Nevertheless, the change in the concept of 
reduced state resulting from this move is not noticed: from being originally conceived as the 
quantum state of the open system, it turns out to be the coarse-grained state of the closed system.  
In summary, reduced states are coarse-grained states that cancel correlations and evolve non-
unitarily. All these peculiar features are absent from those quantum states traditionally referred to by 
the postulates of the theory. Therefore, disregarding these differences is at least curious: it is 
analogous to identify the state represented by the density function ( , )x tρ  with the coarse-grained 
state represented by ( , )cg x tρ  in the interpretation of classical statistical mechanics; as stressed 
above, this is an identification that nobody establishes. The fact that physicists perfectly know how 
to use reduced states in quantum mechanics is not an excuse to refrain from discussing this 
foundational issue. Our aim in the following paragraphs is precisely to analyze the meaning of the 
reduced states, in order to alert regarding their uncritical use in the interpretation context. 
                                                   
1
 Here we will not discuss the question of the supposed priority of pure states over mixed states: following certain 
presentations of the theory (e.g. Ballentine 1998), we will take the generic stance of considering state operators as 
representing quantum states, and pure states as a particular case.  
2
 Wayne Myrvold stressed this point in a comment to our talk at the 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and 
Philosophy of Science (Nancy, July 19-26, 2011). We will come back to this point in the next section. 
3
 We thank one of the anonymous referees for stressing this point. 
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3.  Reduced states in decoherence 
3.a)  Environment-induced decoherence 
The environment-induced decoherence program was born in the seventies, when the measurement 
problem began to be addressed from an open-system perspective: according to that view, 
macroscopic systems such as measurement devices are never closed, but interact significantly with 
their environments (see Zeh 1970, 1973). On the basis of those previous contributions, the theory of 
decoherence was systematized and developed by Zurek and his collaborators in a great number of 
works. According to Zurek (1982, 1991, 1993, 1994), decoherence is a process resulting from the 
interaction between a quantum system and its environment; this process singles out a preferred set of 
states, usually called “pointer basis”, that determines which observables receive definite values. 
Therefore, the first step is to split the universe into the degrees of freedom which are of direct 
interest to the observer, “the system of interest”, and the remaining degrees of freedom usually 
referred to as “the environment”. The environment can be external, such as particles of air or 
photons scattered off the system, or internal, such as collections of phonons or other internal 
excitations.  
As it is well known, the literature on decoherence usually considers a small system S  in 
interaction with a large environment E : the whole composite system S E+  is in a state ( )SE tψ or 
( ) ( ) ( )SE SE SEt t tρ = ψ ψ , where the off-diagonal terms represent the quantum correlations that 
preclude classicality. Of course, the quantum correlations do not vanish throughout the unitary time-
evolution of the state of S E+ . But, according to Zurek, at each time the quantum state of the 
system S  is given by the reduced density operator ( )rS tρ , obtained from the total density operator 
( )SE tρ  by tracing over the environmental degrees of freedom: 
( ) ( )( )rS E SEt Tr tρ = ρ           (2) 
In the phenomenon of decoherence, as time passes the composite system S E+  evolves under the 
influence of the interaction Hamiltonian SEH  in such a way that, after an extremely short 
decoherence time, the reduced state ( )rS tρ  of S  settles down in a time-independent state ( )rS decρ , 
where the off-diagonal terms have vanished. 
According to Zurek, the incessant “monitoring” of some observables by the environment leads 
to the “degradation” of pure states into mixtures. Zurek conceives the reduced state of the 
decohering system S  as its quantum state: according to him, ( )
r
S decρ  denotes a quantum mixture that 
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contains only the terms corresponding to classical correlations. It is precisely for this reason that 
decoherence would offer the clue for solving the quantum measurement problem and for explaining 
the quantum-to-classical transition of the system S . In a certain sense, decoherence would explain 
collapse since “quantum entanglement will be converted into an effectively classical correlation as a 
result of the interaction” between the system and its environment (Paz & Zurek 2002, p. 90). 
As some point out (Leggett 1987, Bub 1997), the theory of environment-induced decoherence 
has become the “new orthodoxy” in the quantum physicists community: many authors consider that 
decoherence finally supplies the right answer to the measurement problem (see, e.g., Auletta 2000, 
Anderson 2001). However, not all are so enthusiastic: the account of measurement given by the 
decoherence theorists has been severely criticized (see, e.g., Healey 1995, Bacciagaluppi 2008). For 
instance, Adler claims that the diagonalized reduced state ( )ρrS dec  does not allow us to say that the 
state of the system S  is in one of the eigenstates ir  of the observable R , and he concludes: “I do 
not believe that either detailed theoretical calculations or recent experimental results show that 
decoherence has resolved the difficulties associated with quantum measurement theory” (Adler 
2003, p. 135). According to Bub (1997), if the eigenstate-eigenvalue link is accepted, the problem is 
even worst: the reduced state is not only unable to explain the occurrence of only one of the 
eigenvalues ir  of R , but it is also inconsistent with that occurrence, since the state of the composite 
system S E+  is always the entangled state ( )SE tψ . These and similar arguments have led even 
some contributors to the decoherence program to express their skepticism about the relevance of 
decoherence to the solution of the measurement problem; as Joos (2000, p. 14) says: “Does 
decoherence solves the measurement problem? Clearly not.” Here we will argue that a way of 
understanding this last claim is to notice that, by contrast to Zurek’s strategy, the reduced state of the 
decohering system S  must not be conceived as its quantum state. 
3.b)  The definition of the reduced state  
The interpretation of a reduced operator as representing the quantum state of a component system of 
a composite system is a usual practice in physics. As Dieks asserts in the case of measurement: “The 
projection operator ψ ψ  is an observable of the total system […]. But we are really interested in 
the individual properties of device and object taken by themselves. Therefore, we need substitutes 
for ψ ψ  that represent the states of these individual systems. In the context of standard quantum 
mechanics such operators are readily available, namely the density operators for the partial 
systems” (Dieks 2007, p. 298); “we took [the reduced operator] 1W  for the state of system 1. This is 
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standard practice in quantum mechanics; however, the usual justification relies on the probabilistic 
interpretation of the theory and the Born rule” (Dieks 2007, p. 299). These quotes suggest that the 
reduced state 1W  is the state of the open system in the same sense as ψ  is the state of the total 
closed system. This is precisely the idea that we want to challenge. 
Mathematically, the reduced state 1
rρ  of a system 1S , which is a component of a larger system 
1 2S S S= +  represented in the Hilbert space 1 2= ⊗H H= H , is a density operator since it satisfies the 
normalization condition ( 1 1rTrρ = ), the Hermitian condition ( †1 1r rρ = ρ ) and the non-negativeness 
condition ( 1 0rϕ ρ ϕ ≥  for all 1ϕ ∈H ). Nevertheless, it denotes an improper mixture (d’Espagnat 
1976): although proper and improper mixtures are represented by the same kind of mathematical 
object −a density operator−, they refer to physically different concepts. In fact, if { }ma  is a basis of 
1H  and { }nb  is a basis of 2H , the reduced states of 1S  and 2S  are obtained as 
1 (2)
r
n nn
Tr b bρ = ρ = ρ∑          (3) 
2 (1)
r
m mm
Tr a aρ = ρ = ρ∑          (4) 
and they are sufficient to compute the expectation value of any observable that belongs exclusively 
to 1S  or 2S , respectively. However, these two density operators are not sufficient, in general, to 
determine the state ρ  of the composite system S , since they provide no information about the 
correlations between 1S  and 2S . Thus, if we could only make measurements on 1S  and could not 
make any on 2S , then we would not be able to differentiate the improper mixture denoted by the 
reduced density operator 1
rρ  from the analog proper mixture denoted by the density operator 1ρ . But, 
as d’Espagnat stresses (1995), there is no theoretical reason that prevents us from having access to, 
at least, some of the traced over degrees of freedom, and this access would permit us to show that the 
proper mixture and the improper mixture are, in principle, testably different. In the context of 
decoherence, the difference is also pointed out by Zeh, one of the founding fathers of the theory: 
“The conceptually important difference between true and apparent ensembles was clearly pointed 
out by Bernard d’Espagnat (1976) when he distinguished between proper and improper mixtures. In 
the case of virtual (reversible) decoherence, this difference can even be observed as recoherence (a 
relocalization of the superposition, that would be impossible for a proper mixture)” (Zeh 2005, p. 
2). 
However, this difference between proper and improper mixtures has been considered an 
insufficient reason for depriving 1
rρ  of the status of being the quantum state of the open system. In 
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fact, some authors insist that improper mixtures are the quantum states of the components of a 
composite system, even though the quantum state of the composite system is not uniquely defined by 
the quantum states of its components: “[W]hile the states of subsystems of a composite system are 
uniquely determined by the state of the composite system via the reduced density operator, the state 
of a composite system is not, in general, uniquely determined by the states of its subsystems.” (Bub 
1997, p. 265; see also Hughes 1989). But this position does not consider the difference regarding 
time-evolutions: whereas quantum states evolve according the Schrödinger (or the von Neumann) 
equation and, therefore, always follow unitary evolutions, improper mixtures in general evolve non-
unitarily. This amounts to admit that, given the basic postulates of quantum mechanics, there are 
certain states that are not ruled by the dynamical postulate of the mechanical theory. 
In this insistence on blurring the difference between proper and improper mixtures, it could 
still be argued that the non-unitary evolution of the reduced states does not imply the violation of 
one of the principles of the theory, to the extent that the dynamical postulate of quantum mechanics 
only applies to closed systems, but says nothing about the time-evolution of open systems. 
According to this viewpoint, reduced operators actually represent quantum states of open quantum 
systems, like those involved in measurement, whose time dependence is ruled by non-unitary 
evolution laws. This amounts to claim that quantum mechanics is a mechanical theory with two 
different kinds of states, each one with its own evolution law. This would be a novelty in physics, 
since the only mechanical theory without a unified state description was Aristotle’s theory, with the 
difference between the sublunar and the supralunar world, each one with its own dynamical law: the 
“law” of the natural places on earth and the “law” of the uniform circular motion in heaven. 
A different strategy is to claim that the true states of quantum mechanics are the reduced states, 
and the unitarily evolving states are a limiting case of those generic states. This is the strategy 
adopted by Cartwright (1983), who proposed to replace the Schrödinger (or the von Neumann) 
equation by the generalized master equation governing the time-evolution of the reduced state as the 
dynamical postulate of quantum mechanics. However, this suggestion must face the difficulty that 
there is no general form of the generalized master equation: it has to be derived case by case 
depending on the specific features of each particular situation, and always on the basis of assuming 
the unitary time-evolution of the closed system. Furthermore, the generalized master equation can be 
viewed as a convenient tool without independent theoretical meaning. In fact, as Paz and Zurek 
(2000, p. 25) admit, “In principle, the evolution equation for [the reduced state] ρ  could be obtained 
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by solving Schrödinger (or von Neumann) equation for the total density matrix and then taking the 
trace. However, this task can be analytically completed in very few cases, and the study of the 
evolution of the reduced density matrix should be done by using some approximations.” In other 
words, in principle we could dispense with the generalized master equation by considering the 
unitary evolution of the whole closed system and taking the partial trace at each particular time to 
obtain the reduced state for that time. This means that the use of the generalized master equation for 
the reduced state is only due to practical limitations and always depends on the unitary evolution of 
the state of the closed system. As a consequence, Cartwright’s proposal of conceiving the reduced 
state and the generalized master equation as the new pair state-dynamical law for quantum 
mechanics is not well founded. 
The insistence on considering the reduced state (improper mixture) as the mixed quantum state 
of the open system seems to forget the definition of the concept of reduced state. The reduced state 
1
rρ  of 1S  is defined as the density operator by means of which the expectation values of all the 
observables belonging to 1S  can be computed. Precisely, if 1H  and 2H  are the Hilbert spaces of 1S  
and 2S  respectively, 1 2= ⊗H H H  is the Hilbert space of S , 1 1 1∈ ⊗Oo H H  is an observable of 1S , 
2I  is the identity in 2 2⊗H H , and ρ ∈ ⊗H = H  is the state of S , then the reduced state of 1S  is 
defined as the density operator 1
rρ  such that 
1
1 2 1, rO O I O Oρ ρ∀ = ⊗ ∈ ⊗ =H H         (5) 
On the basis of this definition, the reduced state can be computed by tracing over the degrees of 
freedom of 2S  as 1 (2)
r Trρ = ρ . As Schlosshauer claims in his well-known book about decoherence, 
this means that, strictly speaking, a reduced density operator is only “a calculational tool” for 
computing expectation values (Schlosshauer 2007, p. 48). For this reason, the author warns us 
“against a misinterpretation of reduced density matrices as describing a proper mixture of states” 
(2007, p. 69).  
Perhaps the fact that proper and improper mixtures cannot be distinguished from a 
mathematical viewpoint is what leads many authors to suppose that the reduced state 1
rρ  is the 
quantum state of the subsystem 1S  in the same sense as ρ  is the quantum state of the whole closed 
system S . However, that mathematical feature essentially depends on the formalism used to express 
the theory, in particular, the Hilbert space formalism; the situation might be different in other cases. 
For instance, it has been proved (Masillo, Scolarici & Sozzo 2009) that proper and improper 
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mixtures are represented by different density operators in the so-called quaternionic formulation of 
quantum mechanics;4 hence they can be distinguished also from a mathematical viewpoint. 
Moreover, this mathematical representation is compatible with their different time-evolutions as 
represented in the orthodox Hilbert space formalism. 
3.c)  The meaning of decoherence 
Once the difference between reduced states and proper quantum states is taken into account, the 
usual claims surrounding decoherence can be critically assessed. For instance, Zurek uses to assert 
that, as a result of the interaction with the environment, “pure states turn into mixtures and rapidly 
diagonalize in the einselected states” (Zurek 2003, p. 729). But, which is the state that begins as 
pure and becomes mixed throughout the time-evolution? Let us suppose that Zurek is talking about 
the proper quantum state of the whole closed system. In this case it is true that, in the usual models, 
it begins as pure; however, that state never becomes mixed since it always evolves according to the 
unitary Schrödinger equation. If we assume, on the contrary, that the non-unitarily evolving state is 
the reduced state of the open system, it is true that it rapidly tends to a diagonalized mixed form; but 
this reduced state never begins as pure since, as it is well-known, if a closed system is in a pure state, 
the reduced states of its subsystems are mixtures.5 As a consequence, although the idea that pure 
states become mixtures has permeated the most part of the literature about decoherence, the clear 
discrimination between different kinds of states allows us to identify the conceptual obscurity of this 
way of understanding decoherence. 
If there are no pure states that become mixtures, the interpretative argument that denies the 
role of decoherence in the solution of the measurement problem appears in a new light. As we have 
seen, after an extremely short decoherence time, the reduced state ( )rS tρ  of the open system S  turns 
out to −approximately− settle down in the state ( )
r
S decρ , where the interference terms have vanished. 
However, ( )
r
S decρ  cannot be interpreted as describing the occurrence of a particular event, associated 
with one of the eigenstates of the apparatus pointer, with the corresponding coefficients representing 
a measure of our ignorance about the event that actually occurred, and the reason for this is that 
( )
r
S decρ  does not represent the mixed quantum state of S . In other words, it cannot be properly said 
                                                   
4
 The quaternionic formulation of quantum mechanics is a formalism based on quaternion fields instead of complex 
fields (see Adler 1995). 
5
 We are grateful to one of the referees for a comment that suggested this critical remark. 
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that decoherence makes the quantum state of the open system to evolve to a final state that contains 
only the terms corresponding to classical correlations.  
Summing up, in an interpretive context, where conceptual matters must be carefully taken into 
account, the definition of the reduced state in terms of expectation values has always to be kept in 
the center of the scene. On this basis, decoherence should be described as a process through which 
the expectation values of all the observables belonging to the open system of interest acquire a 
particular final value (see Castagnino, Laura & Lombardi 2007, Castagnino, Fortin & Lombardi 
2010a, Lombardi, Fortin & Castagnino 2012), without appealing to conceptually unclear evolutions 
that turn quantum entanglement into classical correlations and pure states into mixtures. 
4.  Reduced states in interpretation 
4.a)  Non-interacting systems 
Given a system 1 2S S S= + , represented in 1 2= ⊗H H H , the claim that the reduced states 1
rρ  and 
2
rρ  are not the true quantum states of 1S  and 2S  seems to be reasonable when the components 1S  
and 2S  interact with each other, that is, when the total Hamiltonian of S  is 
1 2 1 2 intH H I I H H= ⊗ + ⊗ + , where 1 1 1 1,H I ∈ ⊗H H , 2 2 2 2,H I ∈ ⊗H H , and int 0H ≠ ∈ ⊗H H . As 
we have seen, in this case both 1
rρ  and 2rρ  evolve non-unitarily: this is the typical situation in 
decoherence. Let us now examine the non-interacting case. 
Harshman and Wickramasekara (2007a, 2007b) use the term “tensor product structure” (TPS) 
to call any partition of the whole system S , represented in the Hilbert space H , into parts 1S  and 
2S  represented in 1H  and 2H . They point out that quantum systems admit a variety of TPSs, each 
one of which leads to a different entanglement between the parts resulting from the partition: 
entanglement is TPS-dependent (see also Healey 2013). However, they also notice that there is a 
particular TPS that is dynamically invariant, and corresponds to the case in which there is no 
interaction between the subsystems 1S  and 2S . In this case, the total Hamiltonian can be 
decomposed as 1 2 1 2H H I I H= ⊗ + ⊗ . Since [ ]1 2 1 2, 0H I I H⊗ ⊗ =  and int 0H = , then, 
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 2exp iHt / exp iH t / exp iH t /− = − −h h h        (6) 
Therefore, if 0 0( ) t t
iHt iHt
t U U e e
−
−
ρ = ρ = ρh h  is the quantum state of S , then 
1 1 1 1
1 (2) (2) 0 (2) 0 10( ) ( )r r
iH t iH t iH t iH tiHt iHt
t Tr t Tr e e e Tr e e e
− −
−   ρ = ρ = ρ = ρ = ρ   
h h h h h h
  (7) 
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2 2 2 2
2 (1) (1) 0 (1) 0 20( ) ( )r r
iH t iH t iH t iH tiHt iHt
t Tr t Tr e e e Tr e e e
− −
−   ρ = ρ = ρ = ρ = ρ   
h h h h h h
  (8) 
This means that the subsystems 1S  and 2S  are dynamically independent: each one of them evolves 
unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation under the action of its own Hamiltonian. Moreover, 
in spite of the fact that ( )tρ , as well as 1 ( )r tρ  and 2 ( )r tρ , evolve with time, the entanglement between 
1S  and 2S  is dynamically invariant: it cannot be expected that entanglement finally vanishes through 
the evolution. 
The difference between the interacting and the non-interacting cases has led some authors to 
review the concept of subsystem in the quantum realm. For instance, in the modal-Hamiltonian 
interpretation (Lombardi & Castagnino 2008, Ardenghi, Castagnino & Lombardi 2009, Lombardi, 
Castagnino & Ardenghi 2010), when 1S  and 2S  do not follow unitary evolutions according to the 
dynamical law of quantum mechanics, they are not viewed as subsystems of S  but as mere “parts” 
of it. Those parts are not quantum systems because they lack independent identity: they are 
conceived as the result of conventional partitions of the whole quantum system S . Nevertheless, in 
the case that there is no interaction between 1S  and 2S  and their time-evolutions are governed by the 
Schrödinger equation, according to the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation there is no obstacle to 
consider them legitimate quantum systems, in particular, subsystems of the composite system S .  
The dynamical independence of non-interacting systems might lead us to suppose that, in this 
particular situation, the reduced states 1 ( )r tρ  and 2 ( )r tρ  can be considered the true quantum states of 
1S  and 2S  respectively. However, this assumption, implicit in several no-collapse interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, proves to be inadequate when certain well-known experimental results are 
taken into account. 
4.b)  Consecutive measurements and reduced states 
In the so-called “first kind” measurements (Pauli 1933), the measurement interaction does not 
destroy the measured system. As a consequence, the question about the result of a second 
measurement on the same system makes sense. As it is experimentally well known, in this first kind 
case there are definite correlations between the outcomes of consecutive measurements. 
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, which relies on the eigenstate-eigenvalue 
link and the hypothesis of collapse, offers a straightforward account of the outcome agreement in 
consecutive measurements of the same observable and of the outcome correlations in consecutive 
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measurements of different observables (see, e.g., Messiah 1961, Cohen-Tannoudji, Diu and Lalöe 
1977). However, since it faces difficulties with respect to other interpretive problems, different no-
collapse interpretations have been proposed, according to which quantum states always follow 
unitary evolutions ruled by the Schrödinger (or the von Neumann) equation. These interpretations try 
to solve the measurement problem by selecting the set of the definite-valued observables for a 
system in a quantum state (for a general characterization of no-collapse interpretations, see Bub 
1992, 1997, Bub & Clifton 1996). As a consequence, no-collapse interpretations usually reject the 
eigenstate-eigenvalue link, and allow the system to have definite-valued properties even if the 
system is not in an eigenstate of the observables representing those properties. 
In the general von Neumann model for ideal first kind measurements, the interaction 
establishes a correlation between the eigenstates ia  of the observable A  of the measured system S  
and the eigenstates ir  of the pointer R  of the measuring apparatus M . When the initial state of S  
is a superposition of the ia , the state of the whole composite system S M+  is 
ψ = ⊗∑ i i i
i
c a r           (9) 
If there is no collapse, the composite system preserves its state ψ . Nevertheless, once the 
interaction ends, S  and M  turn out to be dynamically independent systems and, as stressed above, 
both evolve unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation. This is what may lead to conceive the 
reduced states ( )ρ = ψ ψrS MTr  and ( )ρ = ψ ψrM STr  as the true quantum states of S  and M  
respectively. This view is particularly clear in certain modal interpretations (see review in Lombardi 
& Dieks 2012), such as the Kochen-Dieks interpretation (Kochen 1985, Dieks 1988, 1989, 1998, 
1994a, 1994b), its generalization to mixed states, given by the Vermaas-Dieks interpretation 
(Vermaas & Dieks 1995), and the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation (Lombardi & Castagnino 2008, 
Ardenghi, Castagnino & Lombardi 2009, Lombardi, Castagnino & Ardenghi 2010, Ardenghi & 
Lombardi 2011). The problem with this assumption is that, if taken seriously, it represents an 
obstacle for no-collapse interpretations to explain consecutive measurements (see detailed discussion 
in Ardenghi, Lombardi & Narvaja 2012). 
Let us consider a first measurement performed on S  by a measuring apparatus (1)M . The 
reduced states in this case are 
(1)
2(1) (1) (1)
( )
r
S i i iM iTr c a aρ = ψ ψ = ∑        (10) 
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2(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
( )
r
M S i i iiTr c r rρ = ψ ψ = ∑        (11) 
According to certain no-collapse interpretations, the form of (1)rMρ  is what allows us to say that, 
although the state of the composite system S + (1)M  does not collapse, the pointer (1)R  of the 
apparatus (1)M  indeterministically acquires a certain value (1)kr  with probability 
2
kc . Now, let us 
consider a second measurement performed on S  by a measuring apparatus (2)M  with a pointer 
(2)R . If (1)rSρ  were actually the quantum state of S , then the second measurement of the observable 
A  of S  would establish the following correlation: 
2interaction(2) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)
0 0 0
r
S i i i i iir r c a a r rρ = ρ ⊗ → ρ = ⊗∑    (12) 
The reduced states in this case would be 
( 2 )
2(2) (2)
( )
r
S i i iM iTr c a aρ = ρ = ∑         (13) 
2(2) (2) (2) (2)
( )
r
M S i i iiTr c r rρ = ρ = ∑         (14) 
Here we should say that the pointer (2)R  of the apparatus (2)M  indeterministically acquires a certain 
value (2)lr  with probability 
2
lc . Therefore, if we took seriously the assumption that 
(1)r
Mρ  and (2)rMρ  
are the quantum states of the apparatuses (1)M  and (2)M , we would have no way of explaining the 
agreement between the reading (1)kr  of 
(1)R  in the first measurement and the reading (2)lr  of 
(2)R  in 
the second measurement: the partial trace has cancelled the correlations among the systems involved 
in the measurement process (Ardenghi, Lombardi & Narvaja 2012). This conclusion, obtained in the 
case of consecutive measurements of the same observable, can be easily generalized for consecutive 
measurements of different observables.  
The professional physicist, trained in the framework of the collapse interpretation −or, 
sometimes, of the ensemble interpretation− immediately notices that the use of partial traces to 
compute correlations between the readings of correlative measurements in general leads to wrong 
results.6 On this basis, he might conclude that these results are the clear demonstration that quantum 
measurements cannot be correctly explained without the collapse hypothesis. However, this is not 
the case: the correlations between the outcomes of consecutive measurements can be easily 
accounted for without collapse when the measuring apparatuses are taken into account and, at the 
                                                   
6
 This was the reaction of Rodolfo Gambini when we explained him the basics of modal interpretations. We are grateful 
to him for the interesting discussion that followed. 
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same time, partial traces are dropped in such a way that the only legitimate quantum states are the 
states of the whole closed system. 
4.c)  Consecutive measurements without collapse 
Let us consider a Stern-Gerlach experiment −paradigmatic example of first kind 
measurement−, where the observable A  to be measured is the spin zS  of a particle, with 
eigenvectors z+  and z− , and the role of the pointer 
(1)R  in the first measurement is played by the 
particle’s momentum zP  in z-direction, with eigenvectors 0
zp , zp+  and 
zp
−
. Let us suppose 
that, initially, the particle is in a superposition of z+  and z− , and its momentum in z-direction is 
given by 0
zp . The interaction with the magnetic field establishes a correlation such that 
( )(1) (1)0 0z z zc z c z p c z p c z p+ + − − + + + − − −ψ = + ⊗ → ψ = ⊗ + ⊗   (15) 
If a second measurement is performed on the particle, now on the spin xS , the role of the pointer 
(2)R  in this second measurement is played by the particle’s momentum xP  in x-direction, with 
eigenvectors 0
xp , xp+  and 
xp
−
. Let us suppose that, before the interaction, the second xS -
measuring apparatus is in its ready-to measure state 0
xp : 
( )(2) (1)0 0 0x z z xp c z p c z p p+ + + − − −ψ = ψ ⊗ = ⊗ + ⊗ ⊗      (16) 
In order to show the correlations to be introduced by the second measurement, the states z+  and 
z
−
 must be expressed in the basis { },x x+ − : 
( ) ( )1 12 2z x x z x x+ + − − + −= + = −       (17) 
By replacing eq. (17) into eq. (16): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(2)0 01 / 2 1 / 2z z z z xc p c p x c p c p x p+ + − − + + + − − − ψ = + ⊗ + − ⊗ ⊗   (18) 
Since there is no collapse, the second interaction establishes the correlation between (2)0ψ  and the 
eigenstates xp+  and 
xp
−
of the second pointer xP : 
( )( ) ( )( )(2) 1/ 2 1/ 2z z x z z xc p c p x p c p c p x p+ + − − + + + + − − − −ψ = + ⊗ ⊗ + − ⊗ ⊗  (19) 
or, equivalently, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(2) / 2 / 2
/ 2 / 2
z x z x
z x z x
c x p p c x p p
c x p p c x p p
+ + + + − + − +
+ − + − − − − −
ψ = ⊗ ⊗ + ⊗ ⊗ +
+ ⊗ ⊗ − ⊗ ⊗
    (20) 
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Now the conditional probabilities that link the results of the second measurement with those of the 
first measurement can be computed on the basis of the final non-collapsed state of the whole 
composite system. For instance, we can compute the probability that the second pointer acquires the 
value xp+  in the second measurement, given that the first pointer acquired the value 
zp+  in the first 
measurement, as follows: 
( ) ( )( )
x z
x z
z
pr p p
pr p p
pr p
+ +
+ +
+
∧
=          (21) 
The function ( )x zpr p p+ +∧  is a legitimate probability because xP  and zP  are orthogonal 
components of the momentum of the measured particle and, then, , 0x zP P  =   (see Laura & Vanni 
2008): this is the essential step in this argument since the probability of a conjunction cannot be 
computed in the non-commuting case. The commutation of the pointers in consecutive 
measurements always holds because they belong to different measuring devices which, for this 
reason, are represented by different Hilbert spaces. So, from the first term of eq. (20),  
( ) 2 / 2x zpr p p c+ + +∧ =           (22) 
In turn, ( )zpr p+  can be computed from the first and the third terms of eq. (20): 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2/ 2 / 2zpr p c c c+ + + += + =         (23) 
Therefore, the conditional probability is obtained: 
( ) ( )( )
2
2
/ 2 1
2
x z
x z
z
pr p p c
pr p p
pr p c
+ + +
+ +
+ +
∧
= = =        (24) 
This value agrees with the well-known result obtained by means of the collapse hypothesis. 
The case of consecutive measurements of the same observable can be obtained as a particular 
case of the general argument just presented. If in the second measurement the observable to be 
measured is again zS , then the basis rotation of eq. (17) is not necessary, and the second interaction 
leads the whole system to the state 
(2) z z z zc z p p c z p p+ + + + − − − −ψ = ⊗ ⊗ + ⊗ ⊗       (25) 
Then, now the conditional probabilities are 
( ) ( )( )
2
2 1
z z
z z
z
pr p p c
pr p p
pr p c
+ + +
+ +
+ +
∧
= = =     and    ( ) ( )( ) 2
0 0
z z
z z
z
pr p p
pr p p
pr p c
− +
− +
+ +
∧
= = =   (26) 
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as expected. These results can be easily generalized for any different observables and for any number 
of consecutive measurements.  
These results show that, by contrast to what the defender of the orthodox collapse 
interpretation believes, the experimental observed correlations between the outcomes of consecutive 
measurements can be perfectly explained with no need of the collapse hypothesis. Therefore, if 
certain no-collapse interpretations have difficulties to account for consecutive measurements, this 
fact is not due to their lack of the collapse hypothesis, but it is the consequence of endowing reduced 
states with a feature alien to them. 
Summing up, reduced density operators are mere calculation tools for computing expectation 
values not only in the interacting case: when two systems do not interact but are entangled, the 
assumption that their quantum states are represented by operators obtained by partial traces leads to 
conceptual troubles. In other words, reduced states are not the legitimate quantum states of the 
subsystems of a composite system; in Schlosshauer terms: “Since the two systems A and B are 
entangled and the total composite system is still described by the superposition, it follows from the 
standard rules of quantum mechanics that no individual definite state can be attributed to either one 
of the subsystems. Reduced density matrices of entangled subsystems therefore represent improper 
mixtures” (Schlosshauer 2007, p. 48). In this sense Schlosshauer is completely clear: reduced states 
are not the quantum states of the subsystems of a whole quantum system, since no individual definite 
quantum state can be attributed to them. 
5.  What do reduced states refer to? 
Even if one admits that the reduced state 1
rρ  cannot properly be said to be the quantum state of 1S , it 
is difficult to deny that it supplies a certain description of the quantum system. As noticed above, the 
claim that reduced states are coarse-grained states has appeared in the literature on decoherence (see, 
e.g. Gell-Mann & Hartle 1993, Omnès 1994, Anastopoulos 2002). Nevertheless, in general the claim 
does not go beyond pointing out the operation of tracing over the degrees of freedom of the 
environment. Here we will show that the precise sense in which 1
rρ  provides this description can be 
understood by means of a generalized conception of coarse-graining.  
In its traditional classical form, a coarse-grained description is based on a partition of a phase 
space into discrete and disjoint cells: this mathematical procedure defines a projector Π  (see 
Mackey 1989). In other words, traditional coarse-graining amounts to a projection whose action is to 
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cancel some components of the state vector ρ  corresponding to the fine-grained state: only certain 
components are retained as meaningful in the coarse-grained description cgρ = Πρ . If this idea is 
generalized, coarse-graining can be conceived as an operation that cancels some components of a 
vector representing a state. From this generalized viewpoint, a partial trace is a particular case of 
coarse-graining, since it also cancels certain components of the density operator on which it is 
applied.  
Let us recall the definition of reduced operator, 
1
1 rO Oρ ρ= , where 1 2O O I= ⊗  (see eq. (5)). 
Although for dimensional reasons the reduced state 1
rρ  cannot be expressed as a direct projection 
Πρ  of the quantum state ρ ∈ ⊗H H , with 1 2= ⊗H H H , the expectation value 
1
1 rO ρ  can also be 
expressed as the expectation value of 1 2O O I= ⊗  in a coarse-grained state cgρ ∈ ⊗H H : 
1
1 r
cg
O Oρ ρ=            (27) 
The density operator cgρ  represents a coarse-grained state because it can be obtained as cgρ = Πρ , 
and the projector Π  executes the following operation: 
( ) 2 2(2) 1rTrΠρ = ρ ⊗ δ = ρ ⊗ δ% %          (28) 
where 2 2 2δ ∈ ⊗% H H  is a normalized identity operator with coefficients 2 /αβ αβ γγγδ = δ δ∑% . The 
operator Π  is a projector since 
( ) ( )( )2 2 2 2(2) (2) 1 1r rTr TrΠ Πρ = Πρ ⊗ δ = ρ ⊗ δ ⊗ δ = ρ ⊗ δ = Πρ% % % %      (29) 
It is quite clear that cgρ = Πρ , although belongs to ⊗H H , is not the quantum state of the 
composite system 1 2S S S= +  represented by 1 2= ⊗H H H : it is a coarse-grained state that 
disregards certain information of the quantum state of S . It is interesting to note that cgρ , although 
not the quantum state of S , is a coarse-grained state of the whole closed system S  that may evolve 
non-unitarily. Therefore, it is not the case that non-unitary evolutions are proper of open quantum 
systems. 
On the other hand, if we trace off the degrees of freedom of 2S , we recover the reduced state 
of 1S : 
( )2(2) (2) 1 1r rcgTr Trρ = ρ ⊗ δ = ρ%          (30) 
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This means that the coarse-grained state cgρ , which “erases” the components corresponding to 2S , 
supplies the same information about the open system 1S  as the reduced state 1
rρ , but now from the 
viewpoint of the composite system S  (see Castagnino & Fortin 2013). Therefore, the reduced 
density operator 1
rρ  can also be conceived as a kind of coarse-grained state of S  that disregards 
certain degrees of freedom considered as irrelevant. 
It is worth emphasizing that the arguments presented here, pointing toward the careful 
distinction between proper quantum states and reduced states, do not amount to be committed to 
“The Church of the Large Hilbert Space”. This is the name coined by John Smolin to describe the 
habit of always conceiving a mixed state as the result of a partial trace over a larger system, and any 
non-unitary evolution as being embedded in some unitary evolution of a larger system. Certainly, our 
argumentation points to the fact that, as Paz and Zurek themselves admit, the fundamental dynamical 
law is the unitary time-evolution described by the dynamical postulate of the theory, and any other 
evolution must be defined in terms of that one. Nevertheless, this does not amount to consider pure 
states as the only proper quantum states of the theory. On the contrary, by following other authors 
(see, e.g. Ballentine 1998), in our arguments will have considered that the fundamental quantum 
state of the theory is represented by an operator that can denote both pure and mixed states. In other 
words, not all mixed states can be thought of as the result of a partial trace: there are mixed states 
that are legitimate quantum states not obtained by partial trace, which follow unitary evolutions and 
embody quantum correlations. The subtle point is to keep clear the difference between those 
quantum states and the reduced states, especially in interpretive contexts.7 
Once the reduced state 1
rρ  is viewed as a coarse-grained state, its non-unitary evolution does 
not restrict the application of the dynamical postulate to the quantum states of closed systems nor 
require a new dynamical postulate to be accounted for (recall the discussion of Subsection 2.b). The 
non-unitary evolution of 1
rρ  turns out to be a situation analogous to the familiar case of classical 
instability, where it is completely natural to obtain a non-unitary coarse-grained evolution from the 
underlying unitary dynamics of the unstable system, with no need of restrictions or reformulations of 
the classical dynamical laws (see, e.g., Berkovitz, Frigg & Kronz 2006).8 An author who has 
emphasized the analogy between the classical statistical case and the quantum case is Omnès (2001, 
                                                   
7
 We are grateful to one of the referees for giving us the opportunity of emphasizing this point. 
8
 Of course, this does not mean that the non-unitary evolution of the open subsystems of a quantum system is due to 
instability. The analogy emphasized here is based on the fact that both in unstable classical systems and in open 
quantum systems non-unitarily is obtained as the result of a coarse-graining on a underlying unitary evolution. 
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2002); he has repeatedly claimed that decoherence is a particular case of the phenomenon of 
irreversibility. Now the acknowledgement of the coarse-grained nature of the reduced state rSρ  
allows us to endow that claim with a more precise meaning. As in the case of classical instability, 
where the coarse-grained state ( )cg tρ  approaches a final state ( )cg eqρ  in spite of the unitary law 
ruling the evolution of the dynamical state, in decoherence the state ( )rS tρ  approaches a state ( )rS decρ  
( ( )( )r rS S dectρ → ρ ), in spite of the fact that the quantum state indefinitely follows its unitary evolution. 
As it was said above, even if one accepted that a quantum mixed state could be interpreted in 
terms of the ignorance about the definite values of certain observables (an assumption that we will 
not discuss here), this interpretation is useless for decoherence because the reduced state rSρ  of the 
decohering system is not its quantum mixed state. Now one can take a further step: when the coarse-
grained origin of the reduced state is acknowledged, it is not difficult to see that decoherence is a 
relative phenomenon (for this claim, see Castagnino, Laura & Lombardi 2007). In fact, since many 
different coarse-grainings can be applied on a same closed system, there are many ways in which the 
whole closed system can be partitioned into a system of interest S  and its environment E , and the 
occurrence of decoherence or not must be studied for each particular partition (for the study of 
decoherence in different partitions of a single system, see Castagnino, Fortin & Lombardi 2010a, 
2010b). 
6.  Conclusions 
As stressed in the Introduction, reduced states obtained by partial traces are commonly considered as 
the quantum states of the subsystems of a closed system. Here we have argued against this 
assumption, both in the case that the subsystems interact with each other −the case of decoherence−, 
and in the case that there is no interaction between them −the case of no-collapse accounts of 
measurement−. Finally, we have shown that the reduced state of a subsystem has to be viewed as a 
coarse-grained state of the composite system to which it belongs. In summary, according to our 
view: 
− Quantum states, pure or mixed, always follow unitary evolutions and embody quantum 
correlations. 
− Given a composite system S  in a pure or mixed quantum state ρ , in the generic case −when the 
subsystems interact or are entangled with each other−: 
• no quantum state, pure or mixed, can be attributed to the subsystems iS  of S . 
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• the reduced states riρ  of the subsystems iS  of S  
∗ are not the quantum states of the iS , because reduced states may evolve non unitarily and 
cancel correlations, and 
∗ can be conceived as a kind of coarse-grained states of the composite system S , which 
disregard certain degrees of freedom considered as irrelevant. 
The argumentation of the present work must not be understood as a mere semantic discussion 
about the label to be attached to operators obtained by partial trace. Once we deprive reduced states 
of their role as quantum states of subsystems, new perspectives open up to our consideration. On the 
one hand, we can undertake a new reading of the phenomenon of decoherence, a reading that might 
account for situations not included in the orthodox environment-induced view (see Lombardi, Fortin 
& Castagnino 2012). On the other hand, we are led to rethink no-collapse interpretations, and the 
role played by reduced states in the selection of the definite-valued observables in quantum systems 
(see Ardenghi, Lombardi and Narvaja 2012). As a consequence, the physical meaning of reduced 
states deserves to be seriously discussed, since it has substantial consequences for the foundations of 
quantum mechanics. 
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